Charitable Trusts--Certainty of Purpose by Reznick, Joseph D.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 8 
Number 2 Volume 8, May 1934, Number 2 Article 8 
June 2014 
Charitable Trusts--Certainty of Purpose 
Joseph D. Reznick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Reznick, Joseph D. (1934) "Charitable Trusts--Certainty of Purpose," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 8 : No. 2 , 
Article 8. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss2/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the facts and over the objection and protest of the plaintiff, took
down its building including the entire party wall." 3 It could not
possibly be maintained that plaintiff had abandoned the wall and its
rights in it.
Had plaintiff wished to raise the height of its building, extend
the wall to the rear or alter the tenement house that originally stood
on the premises, it could have used the party wall for that purpose
and defendant could not rightfully have interfered. Why, then,
should defendant be allowed to interfere when plaintiff wishes to
erect a new building, fully satisfied with the condition of the wall as
it exists? There is authority holding that one who wishes to rebuild
cannot tear down the party wall when it is not dilapidated but must
use it, if it affords a sufficient support for his building.34  Plaintiff
was doing no more than complying with the law. Should he be
penalized? The writer respectfully submits that on principle and
reason the court went astray. The doubts that the court itself
evinced by the dissent of two judges, who unfortunately did not hand
down opinions, have been, in the writer's estimation, resolved against
the decision of the court.
ANTHONY CURRERI.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS-CERTAINTY OF PURPOSE.
A charitable trust is a gift to indefinite or uncertain beneficiaries
for the purpose of "either bringing their minds or hearts under
the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies 'from
disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish them-
selves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works,
or otherwise lessening the burdens of government." ' At the out-
set it is well to note certain distinctive features of this type of trust.
(1) It is founded upon a humanitarian view looking to the
improvement and well being of mankind.2
"357 East Seventy-sixth Street Corp. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 237 App.
Div. 717, 262 N. Y. Supp. 705 (1st Dept. 1933).
' Partridge v. Lyon, 67 Hun 29, 21 N. Y. Supp. 848 (1893).
1Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365, 369 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894);
Stuart v. Easton, 74 Fed. 854, 859 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1896), aff'd, 170 U. S. 383,
18 Sup. Ct. 650 (1898) ; People v. Fitch, 154 N. Y. 14, 32, 47 N. E. 983, 988(1897) ; Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 556 (1867).
'Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303, 24 L. ed. 450 (1874) ; Tilden
v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880 (1892), wherein the phrase "well doing
and well being of mankind" was used in denoting the purpose of the chari-
table trust.
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(2) The beneficiaries must of necessity be indefinite and un-
certain as an element of the definition. 3
(3) It must be for some public purpose as distinguished from
a purely selfish or private purpose in the guise of charity.
4
(4) It does not necessarily have to be exclusively for the
benefit of the poor.5
(5) The rule against perpetuities does not affect this type of
trust,6 but it must take effect within the prescribed period of vesting
and if it meets this requirement, the power of alienation may be
suspended beyond the statutory period.7
In a recent case 8 the testatrix had directed her executor to
pay stated sums to various persons and associations, providing for
the remainder as follows: "Any remainder after these bequests
have been made, I leave to A. G. H. to use at his discretion in pro-
moting the ends of justice." The court held this to be an absolute
gift on the ground that the testatrix showed no -intent to create
a trust, as the words used were not legal terms sufficient for that
purpose; that if the words "at his discretion" were omitted, the re-
mainder of the clause might be a limitation on the use of the funds,
which might show an intent to create a trust. In its entirety, the
clause raises the question whether the discretion applies in determin-
ing whether the funds should or should not be put to the use desig-
nated, or does it apply in determining what are the "ends of justice."
If it refers to the former there would be no intention to create a
trust as the trustee would have the power to defeat it, if to the
latter, an intent to create a trust would be manifested. In constru-
ing this clause to be a gift the court invokes the familiar principles
governing wills, that such construction will be adopted as will avoid
the implication that the testatrix intended to leave a major part of
'Bowman v. Domestic, etc. Soc., 182 N. Y. 494, 75 N. E. 535 (1905);
Richtman v. Watson, 150 Wis. 385, 136 N. W. 797 (1912) ; In re MacDowell's
Will, 217 N. Y. 454, 112 N. E. 177 (1916); Stewart v. Franchetti, 167 App.
Div. 541, 153 N. Y. Supp. 453 (1st Dept. 1915).
"In re Shattuck's Will, 193 N. Y. 446, 86 N. E. 455 (1908) ; In re Robin-
son, 203 N. Y. 380, 96 N. E. 925 (1911); In re MacDowell's Will, supra
note 3; In the Matter of Frasch, 245 N. Y. 174, 156 N. E. 656 (1927).
'Am. Academy of Arts and Science v. Pres., etc. of Harvard College, 78
Mass. 582 (1832); Godfrey v. Hutchines, 28 R. I. 517, 68 Atl. 317 (1907);
Buchanan v. Kennard, 234 Mo. 117, 136 S. W. 415 (1911); Little v. City of
Newburyport, 210 Mass. 414, 96 N. E. 1032 (1912).
'Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 524 (1853); Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y.
122, 55 N. E. 568 (1899); Matter of Griffin, 167 N. Y. 71, 60 N. E. 284
(1901) ; Matter of MacDowell's Will, supra note 3; Matter of Davidge, 200
App. Div. 437, 193 N. Y. Supp. 245 (2d Dept. 1922).
7 Leonard v. Burr, 18 N. Y. 96 (1858) ; cited with approval in Booth et al.
v. Baptist Church et al., 126 N. Y. 235, 28 N. E. 238 (1891).
'In the Matter of Hayes, 263 N. Y. 219, 188 N. E. 716 (1934).
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her estate undisposed of; 9 and where words used are absolute in
character followed by words which do not limit or cut down the
bequest, an absolute gift is intended.10
These grounds in themselves would have been sufficient to up-
hold the decision in this case. There is no doubt but that the rules
are sound and well established as the law of this state, but in the
course of its opinion the court goes on to say, "The broad con-
struction avoids implying an attempt on the part of the testatrix
to create a trust which, if intended, might be void for uncertainty
of object and beneficiary." " This statement shows the existence
of a doubt on the part of the court. The question presented by this
decision is whether it is possible to uphold it as a valid charitable
bequest? It is respectfully submitted that the same -result might
have been accomplished were the residuary clause to be upheld as a
valid trust. In that case the construction adopted to avoid intestacy
would not be necessary as everything not disposed of would fall
into the residuum. Admittedly there are two constructions possible
as to the presence of an intent on the part of the testatrix to create
a trust. Where a will is possible of two interpretations, one which
will uphold and declare it valid and the other void, that which sus-
tains its validity is adopted.12 Applied to charitable trusts this rule
gains even greater strength, since this trust is favored in law.'3 It
is, therefore, possible to say with impunity that the discretion ap-
plies only to determining what are the "ends of justice" and so take
from the trustee the power to defeat the object of the trust. This
raises the question whether or not a contention that a trust for the
purpose of promoting the "ends of justice" is so indefinite, as to
beneficiaries and object, as to be invalid. In view of some of the
recent decisions and the trend of thought of the courts in general
in regard to bequests for charitable purposes, it is probable that
such a bequest could be sustained, if these were the only objections
to its validity. Since in the instant case the court did not definitely
say that the clause was void for uncertainty but only that it might
be, and the decision went on other grounds, it is only proper to
I Schult v. Moll, 132 N. Y. 122, 30 N. E. 377 (1892); Meeks v. Meeks,
161 N. Y. 66, 55 N. E. 278 (1899) ; Hodcox v. Cady, 213 N. Y. 570, 108 N. E.
84 (1915); Waterman v. N. Y. Life Ins. and Trust Co., 237 N. Y. 293, 142
N. E. 668 (1923).
11Foose v. Whitmore, 82 N. Y. 405 (1880) ; Clark v. Leupp, 88 N. Y. 228(1882); Post v. Moore, 181 N. Y. 18, 73 N. E. 483 (1905); Johnson v.
Hughes, 187 N. Y. 450, 80 N. E. 374 (1907).
263 N. Y. at 227, 188 N. E. at 719.
'2Seitz v. Faversham, 205 N. Y. 197, 98 N. E. 385 (1912); Matter of
MacDowell's Will, supra note 3, at 465; Matter of Lally, 136 App. Div. 781,
121 N. Y. Supp. 467 (2d Dept. 1910), aff'd, 198 N. Y. 608, 92 N. E. 1089
(1910).
10 Rotch v. Emerson, 105 Mass. 431 (1870) ; St. John's v. Andrew's Insti-
tute, 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981 (1908) ; Matter of Robinson, supra note 4;
Dykeman v. Jenkines, 179 Ind. 549, 101 N. E. 1013 (1913) ; Buell v. Gardner,
83 Misc. 513, 144 N. Y. Supp. 945 (1914).
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review some authoritative decisions to resolve the doubt as to this
point.
The indefiniteness of beneficiaries can no longer be a sound ob-
jection to the validity of this bequest.' 4 The less certain the bene-
ficiaries are the more certain is the fact that the public in general
was intended to be benefited. If the beneficiaries are pointed out
with a great degree of certainty the trust may be private and not a
charitable trust.15 Whatever the rule might have been before 1893
it can not now have any effect on the instant question. The Legisla-
ture has remedied that defect by the Charitable Uses Act, which
provides:
"No gift, grant, or devise to religious, educational,
charitable or benevolent use, which shall in other respects be
valid under the laws of this state shall be deemed invalid by
reason of indefiniteness or uncertainty of the person desig-
nated as the beneficiary thereunder in the instrument creating
the same * * *P 16
In Bauman v. Domestic and Foreign Missionary Soc.1 7 a be-
quest was left "to be equally divided between the Indian Missions
and the Domestic Missions of the United States." There was no
such organization or corporation in existence. Even though there
were no express words of trust and the beneficiaries named were
not in esse the bequest was upheld as a charitable trust and the pro-
ceeds turned over to the claimant, the Domestic and Foreign Mis-
sionary Soc., an organization in which the testatrix exhibited an in-
terest during her lifetime. In Bird v. Merklee 18 a bequest was
made to a certain church to buy coal "for the poor" of the church.
It was held to be a gift to the church. This case was decided but
two years after the above statute was passed. Undoubtedly the
statute was not then regarded with the liberality it gained with time.
This is even more clearly brought out if we consider the cases of
trusts for masses. In the first instance they were regarded as in-
valid because they were deemed to be for a superstitious use. They
were next regarded as being without beneficiaries,' while today
" Bowman v. Domestic, etc. Missionary Soc., supra note 3; Starr v.
Selleck, 205 N. Y. 545, 98 N. E. 1116 (1911); Stewart v. Franchetti, supra
note 3; it re Groot, 226 N. Y. 576, 123 N. E. 867 (1919); Matter of Morris,
227 N. Y. 141, 124 N. E. 724 (1919) ; In re Davidge's Will, supra note 6.
'Yates v. Yates, 9 Barb. 324 (N. Y. 1852) ; Sherwood v. American Bible
Soc., 4 Abb. 227 (N. Y. 1864) ; Bullard v. Chandler, 149 Mass. 532, 21 N. E.
95 (1899).
'IN. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1909) §12; N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW (1909) §113.
17182 N. Y. 494, 75 N. E. 535 (1905).
"144 N. Y. 544, 39 N. E. 645 (1895).
Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451, 2 N. E. 464 (1885); Holland v.
Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312, 16 N. E. 305 (1888).
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they are upheld on the theory that those who attend are the bene-
ficiaries. 20 In the light of the recent decisions on the subject, a
contention that a charitable trust is invalid because of indefiniteness
of beneficiaries is clearly untenable. If in the exercise of the dis-
cretion in determining what are the "ends of justice," a case arose
which would justify an application of the funds, the beneficiaries
would then be sufficiently certain and that would be sufficient.
This leads to the consideration of the charitable purpose and
the degree of certainty required where this is the objection raised
to the validity of the charitable trust. No general rules can here
be laid down as to what is a charitable purpose. There are, how-
ever, certain elements which generally characterize such a purpose.
The gift is required to be for some public benefit or use or to enure
to the benefit of a large portion of the public.21 It must also come
within the rule laid down in the Robinson 22 and Cunningham 23
cases in that the purpose must be sufficiently identified so as to
make it possible and practicable for the court, in the first instance,
to administer the bequest.2 4 What is or what is not within these
requirements is best brought out by illustration and example. In
Going v. Emery 25 a bequest "to the cause of Christ, for the bene-
fit and promotion of true evangelical piety and religion" was sus-
tained as a valid charitable bequest and was said to be sufficiently
definite and certain. In Manley v. Fiske2 6 the remainder was left
to the executors to be by them divided "among such American chari-
ties they may think well of'" and asking sums be given "to any so-
ciety that assists poor needlewomen" and the court held that the
charitable purpose of the gift was sufficiently identified. In In re
Welch 27 a bequest "to charity" was sustained as a valid charitable
trust. From this case it would seem that indefiniteness should be
no objection so long as it be for a charitable purpose. In Stewart v.
Franchetti 28 a bequest was upheld as sufficiently certain where it
provided that it was "to be spent in charity in Italy and New
York." Obviously here the places where it is to be spent are named
and definite. The boundaries are defined and limited with certainty,
Nut what of the object? Is it limited with any definiteness and
precision? Although it has been said that courts are unwilling to
'Matter of Morris, supra note 14.
'In re MacDowell's Will, supra note 3; In re Robinson, supra note 4;
In re Shattuck, supra note 4.
'In re Robinson, supra note 4.
'In re Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 601, 100 N. E. 437 (1912).
2"203 N. Y. at 385, 96 N. E. at 926; 206 N. Y. at 605, 100 N. E. at 438.
' 16 Pick. 107 (Mass. 1834); see also Rohodes v. Yater, 27 N. M. 489,
202 Pac. 698 (1921), wherein a trust for "Evangelization" and preaching the
gospel was sustained as certain.
"139 App. Div. 665, 124 N. Y. Supp. 149 (1st Dept. 1910), aff'd, 210 N.
Y. 546, 95 N. E. 1133 (1911).
"105 Misc. 27, 172 N. Y. Supp. 349 (1918).
167 App. Div. 541, 153 N. Y. Supp. 453 (1st Dept. 1915).
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hold a trust "for charity" valid 29 it seems that one to "be spent
in charity" is just over the line and is therefore valid when it is
limited within given boundaries, whether the boundaries be that of
a city or country would seem to be unobjectionable. So, too, be-
quests in trust "to provide shelter, necessaries of life, education, gen-
eral or specific, and such other financial aid as may seem to them
fitting and proper to such other persons as they shall select as being
in need of the same" 30 and "to be applied to the benefit of such
charitable and benevolent associations and institutions of learning
for the general uses and purposes of such associations and insti-
tutions as my executors shall select" 31 have been sustained as be-
ing certain and sufficient. In the the latter example when the case
was before the surrogate, he held that the word "charitable" quali-
fied the term "institutions of learning" as well as the word "asso-
ciations" and was in effect to be construed as though it were "to
such charitable associations and to such benevolent associations and
such institutions of learning as are charitable." The manifestation
of this definite charitable purpose as construed insured the validity
of this bequest. This is an excellent example of liberality in con-
struction and shows the extent to which the courts have gone to up-
hold gifts for charitable purposes. In the Matter of Dubraw3 2 a
bequest was left to the executors and they were directed "to dis-
tribute where he or she or his successor or substitute, in his or her
judgment shall consider it will be most effective in the advancement
of Christ's Kingdom on Earth." The court here implied a trust and
held it not to be indefinite or uncertain either as to beneficiaries or
purpose. How in the light of this case can it be said that a trust
"to be used in promoting the ends of justice" may be void for in-
definiteness. Its purpose is not contrary to law. Can it be that
the word itself is so uncertain or loose in meaning that it may with
impunity be said to be uncertain? On the contrary, it has a more
limited and certain meaning in the mind of social man. In every
language or creed the word in the popular sense means "the render-
ing to every man his due" 33 and in the legal sense has even a more
restricted meaning. While we may differ as to the best means of
advancing "Christ's Kingdom on Earth" and in fact the varying
Christian creeds do differ in this respect, there can be no such dif-
ference in "promoting the ends of justice" as we have but one code
in regard to its administration and it applies to all alike. Reasoning
2'Matter of Shattuck, supra note 4.
*'In re Robinson, supra note 3.
= In re Cunningham, supra note 23.
245 N. Y. 469, 157 N. E. 747 (1927).
n State v. Jelks, 138 Ala. 115, 35 So. 60 (1903) ; Livingston Oil Corp. v.
Henson, 90 Okla. 6, 215 Pac. 1057 (1923). "Justice is the end of government.
It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be, pursued, until
it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." McKinister v. Sager,
163 Ind. 671, 686, 72 N. E. 854 (1905).
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by analogy it would seem that a trust "to promote the ends of
justice" would not be objectionable because of indefiniteness. In
the words of Justice Willard Bartlett speaking for the court in the
Cunningham case "if that (referring to the Robinson case) was
capable of being executed by judicial decree, so is this. The difficul-
ties in the way of administering the trust here, so as to carry out the
charitable intentions of the testator, are no greater than they were
there; and having sustained that gift, after careful consideration, I
think we must sustain this one." 34 This leaves for consideration
the remaining question whether the general purpose of the attempted
trust can be said to be charitable in its nature.
Here again it is possible to sustain this trust, since gifts have
been sustained which had for their object and purpose the promo-
tion of peace,35 temperance 36 and to relieve the suffering and pro-
mote the comfort of animals 37 as charitable in purpose. Contrary
to the law in Massachusetts 38 a gift to extend suffrage for women
was upheld in Illinois 39 as a charitable trust. The doctrine has even
been extended so as to include a theatre as a gift in trust for the
people of a town as a charitable use on the ground that it will in-
crease their happiness and social welfare. 40 Obviously a trust "to
promote the ends of justice" can be supported on the ground not
only that it promotes social welfare but tends to lift the burden
of government since the administration of justice is a function of
and an important branch in the structure of government.
The only logical conclusion as a result of consideration of the
subject is that the recent trend in the liberality of thought resolves
every possible doubt in favor of the charitable purpose. This view
finds support in the recent adjudication by the Federal Court in the
case of Chicago Bank of Commerce v. McPherson,41 where a be-
quest of income and principal was directed to be expended for "such
charitable, benevolent and educational and public welfare uses" as
the trustees may elect. The court upheld this bequest as a valid
charitable gift, and not to be uncertain either as to objects or bene-
ficiaries. Here the court takes into consideration the present eco-
nomic depression in upholding this gift. It considers the grave con-
ditions existing at the time this Codicil was executed in 1930, and
points to the fact that the term "public welfare" had come to be
synonymous with "public charity" and so signified some form of re-
lief to those affected by the spread of unemployment. 42 This is
"In re Cunningham, supra note 23, at 608, 100 N. E. at 439.
Tappen v. Deblois, 45 Me. 122 (1858).
"Buell v. Gardner, supra note 13.
'In re Graves, 242 Ill. 23, 89 N. E. 672 (1910); In re Coleman, 167 Cal.
212, 138 Pac. 992 (1914).
'Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539 (Mass. 1867).
Garrison v. Little, 75 111. 402 (1898).
'Nixon v. Brown, 46 Nev. 439, 214 Pac. 524 (1923).
62 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
"Id. at 397.
NOTES AND COMMENT
in truth liberality in construction and appreciation of the fact that
where a charitable intent manifests itself in a will, however vague,
if possible to do so, the intent should be given effect.
JOSEPH D. REZNICK.
SCHACKNO ACT AND REORGANIZATION.
As Samson sent the walls of the temple crashing about the.heads
of the Philistines, so has President Roosevelt sent reputedly sacred
and inviolable legal precepts crashing about the heads of the
"precedent" lawyers. By applying, to the fullest extent, the weight
of popular support to the powerful lever of public opinion, the Presi-
dent has sufficiently disturbed "solid" foundations of the law so as
to afford an opportunity for legal reform such as has never before
been presented since the formation of the country. "Emergency"
legislation passed in former times was admittedly but temporary;
that which is being passed under the guidance of the present admin-
istration has for its end the permanent reformation of an apparently
imperfect governmental philosophy. It may designate itself as
"temporary" legislation, but, as an integral part of the New Deal, it
must, of necessity, have for its ultimate purpose an effect as perma-
nent and lasting as has the New Deal itself. Never has the adage
that "a chain is as strong as its weakest link" been more forcibly
illustrated.
As a part of this reform program, the Schackno Act ' has been
enacted in New York. Its validity was challenged and it was held,
by Judge Frankenthaler, to be unconstitutional.2 Such decision was
reached in spite of the fact that the same statute had previously been
declared constitutional by Judge Morschauser in Schmaling v. Bur-
ling,3 and by Judge Hinkley in Matter of Title & Mortgage Guar-
antee Company of Buffalo.4 The latter case, as well as the instant
1 L. 1933, c. 745.
'In the Matter of the Application of Abrams for an Order Restraining
Van Schaick, Rehabilitator, from making payments under c. 745, L. 1933.
Such legislation may be validly enacted by Congress for the prohibition
against the enactment of laws impairing the obligation of contracts is directed
only against the states. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718 (1878).
See Canada Southern Railway v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 535, 536, 3 Sup.
Ct. 363 (1883), wherein the court, having reference to legislation similar in
substance to that herein involved, said: "The confirmation and legalization of
'a scheme of arrangement' under such circumstances is no more than is done
in bankruptcy. * * * In no just sense do such governmental regulations deprive a
person of his property without due process of law. They simply require each
individual to so conduct himself for the general good as not to unnecessarily
injure another."
'269 N. Y. Supp. 747 (1933).
'149 Misc. 643, 269 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1933).
